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In this paper we develop a framework for determining optimal dynamic taxa-
tion based on maximizing welfare in a macro-economic market economy with
value-maximizing firms, which face costs of adjustment for investment and
utility optimizing consumers. We derive welfare rankings of often used tax
rates such as profit tax, sales tax, consumption and wage tax. However,
such an optimal tax policy may be time-inconsistent, and therefore, also
the implications of time-inconsistency for welfare rankings of tax rates
are given. It is shown that the wage and consumption tax rate cannot be a
source for time-inconsistency, which gives an incentive to implement these
taxes.
1. Introduction
Many recent papers have developed macro-economic models to study the
dynamic evolution of the economy in order to analyze dynamic effects of
fiscal policy (e.g. Hall (19~1), Brock and Turnovsky (1981), Abel and
Blanchard (1983), Judd (1985) and Van de Klundert and Peters (1986)). Aim
of these papers is to investigate the incidence of different tax rates
such as a tax on profits, a sales tax, a wage tax or a consumption tax.
However, in these kinds of models the tax rates are given exogenously.
Recently, there was a policy discussion in the United States (e.g.
Andrew Kupfer in the Fortune of August 1988) about which tax rates should
be raised.
"They (Bush or Dukakis) will raise your taxes, after they are safely
elected. But not all the pain is created equal. You don't necessarily have
to sell out ~Ox of your salary in income taxes to cure the budget deficit.
There are other taxes that nibble at your wallet a little bit at a time:
consumption taxes, which tax you when spend." (p.24)
w
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In this paper we deal with this problem by a more normative approach. We
are concerned with optimal dynamic taxation, where the government wants to
maximize the utility of a repx~esentative consumer (e.g. Turnovsky and
Brock (1980)) and tries to choose its tax rate in such a way that this ob-
jective is maximized. Moreover, we assume that the government takes into
account the way that the firm and consumer will react on its tax policy.
So, the government behaves as the leader in an open-loop Stackelberg equi-
librium (e.g. BaSar and Olsder (1982)). However, as pointed out by Kydland
and Prescott (197~) and Calvo (1978) such an optimal policy may be time-
inconsistent. Once the current is history, the effect of policies on
behavior in that period are of little of no interest. Therefore, we are
concerned with two possible solutions. The first solution, whích is the
formal outcome of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium of game between
government, consumers and firms, is only credible, if there is commitment
or if there are reputational forces. The second solution, which correspons
to a Nash-Cournot equilibrium is time-consistent, but yields a lower value
of steady-state utility. In this paper we show that this problem of time-
consistency depends on the kind of tax rates the government chooses.
Our approach builds on Abel and Blanchard's (1983) macro-economic
market model, which describes intertemporal choice of consumers and firms
in a free market economy. Abel and Blanchard use this framework to analyze
the dynamic effects of fiscal policy. We extend the Abel and Blanchard
model by modelling optimal government's behavior and give some rules for
the optimal choice of tax policy.
Much attention has been paid in the literature to the problem of op-
timal government's behavior, especially in tax problems (see for a survey
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)). However, most papers deal with this problem
in a micro-economic way. For instance, they treat taxation on different
commodities (e.g. Diamond and Mirlees (1971)) or optimal income taxation
(e.g. Mirlees (1971), Dixit and Sandmo (19~6)). A macro-economic example
of optimal taxation is the paper by Turnovsky and Brock (1980), but in
this model there is no capital accumulation. A model with capital ac-
cumulation and optimal capital and labor taxation is the paper by Fischer
(1980). Since this is a two-period model with no separation between con-
sumers and firms, no accumulation in the second period, only labor and3
capital taxes and no taxes in the first period, this paper disregards some
important issues. Nevertheless, it is a nice example illustrating the
time-inconsistency in dynamic optimal taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we model the
firms'and consumers' decision problem. F'urthermore, the equilibrium on the
goods and labor market is described. In section 3 we describe optimal
government's behavior, if it takes into account the way that the agents
will make their decisions. In section 4 we interpret the calculations of
section 3. Finally, in section 5 we make some remarks and suggestions for
future research.
2. The Pirm's and consumer's decision problem
For reasons of analytical tractability we assume that there is only
one representative type of consumer and firm. The consumer and the firm
are confronted with the following types of tax rates: a profit tax rate, a
wage tax rate, a consumption tax rate and a sales tax rate.
2.1. The firm
Consider a firm operating in an environment without exogenous
uncertainty. The firm decides on its demand for labor and investment,
which are conditional on its expectations, present and future profit tax
rates and present and future interest rates. The firm maximizes ita dis-
counted stream of net profits
t
-Jr(v)dv
max f [{f(k,R)(1-Ty)-wl}(1-~Z)-i-~(i)]e o dt, (i)
i,l 0
p(0)-0, sign(p )-sign(i), p )0,
where k, ,~, i, w, r, f(k „~), p(i), TZ and Ty denote respectively the level
of the capital stock, the number of employed workers, the rate of invest-
ment, the real wage rate, the rate of interest, the production function,
the internal adjustment costs, the proportional tax rate on profits and
the proportional tax rate on sales.4
With respect to the production function we assume that capital and
labor are substitutes and production is characterised by constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas function (so that fR~fkk - fk~ - 0) with 6 the
parameter of this function. The planning horizon is infinite. The strictly
convex function p(.) captures that internal adjustment costs increase and
are zero only if gross investment is zero. It ensures that capital adjusts
in a sluggish manner to changes in interest rate and tax rates. The firm
will maximize (1) subject to the capital accumulation equation
k - i - bk, (2)
where b is the rate of depreciation.
The necessary conditions for the firm's optimal control problem are:
t
-fr(v)dv
q-(r'b)q - fk(1-TZ)(1-i~). lim e ~ q(t)k(t) - o. (3)





k - i - bk. (6)
in which q is the (undiscounted) shadow price of capital, and go denotes
the derivative of p with respect to i and we add subscripts to f to denote
partial derivatives.
The investment demand depends on q(cf. (4)):
i - ~(q). ~ ~0. ~(1)-0. (7)
An expression for q, which is equal to the present value of marginal
profits, can be obtained by solving the differential equation (3)5
s
-f(r(v).b)dv
q(t) - f fk(k.,~)(1-TZ)(1-Ty)e t ds.
t (8)
After having paid wages to the workers, the firm has to decide how to dis-
tribute profit and to finance investment. It may finance investment by
retained earnings or by issuing new shares or bonds. We will assume that
there is fiscal equality between equity or bonds and shares, so that all
financing schemes are equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same
path of consumption and investment (for a proof of this see Abel and
Blanchard (1983. PP. 680-681)).
2.2. The Consumer
With respect to the consumer we will assume that he takes present
and future wage rates, interest rates, tax rates and dividend paid by the
firm as given. Furthermore, we assume that the welfare of a consumer
depends on private (c) and public consumption (g). Given a constant rate
of time preference g, the decision problem is to choose a time path of
consumption, that maximizes the present value of utility
-st
max f u(c,g)e dt
c 0
subject to the wealth constraint, which can be expressed as
(9)
b- rb t R. wR(1-TR) - c(ltTC). b(0) - b0. (10)
where b, n, T~ and Tc denote respectively the amount of bonds hold by the
consumer, dividends, the proportional tax rate on wages and the propor-
tional tax rate on consumptioii. The utility function is assumed to be
concave in i ts arguments, such that the marginal utility from the consump-
tion of both private and public goods is positive. Furthermore, income is6
the sum of wages, interest on savings and dividends. Furthermore, we as-
sume that there are No-Ponzi games, i.e.,
t
-fr(v)dv
lim e ~ b(t) - 0.
t~
The optimality conditions are:
uc~(lttc) - x,




in which x is the costate variable associated with the dynamic budget
constraint and we add subscripts to the utility function to indicate par-
tial derivatives. As shown by Abel and Blanchard total consumption is the
sum of human wealth and non-human wealth. It is assumed that the supply of
labor is inelastic.
2.3. Market Clearing
Assume that there is an equilibrium on the goods market, so that
spendings in this economy are equal to production:
f(k,.~) - c. g t i t P(i). (1L})
This condition determines at any instant of time the interest rates, while
the wage rate is determined by equilibrium in the labor market. Because
the supply of labor (,~s) is assumed to be inelastic it is not difficult to
derive the wage rates, which are given by equality of demand and supply of
labor
~s - ,~. (15)7
3. Optimal government's policies
The question we are now adressing ourselves at is: how will the
government choose its tax rates when confronted with the behavior of the
consumer and firm as described in section 2. Zt is reasonable to assume
that the government takes into account the mannner in which the firm and
consumer react on its taxation decisions. We therefore formulate our
problem in a game-theoretic framework. The formal outcome of our model
corresponds to a three persons open-loop Stackelberg game with the govern-
ment as leader and the firm and consumer playing Nash against each other
(cf. Basar and Olsder (1982)). An important question in this respect is:
will the government take into account, that the market prices, r and w,
also depend on its tax policy? We will assume that this is not the case.
Moreover, it is our guess that this effects are relatively small. As
mentioned before the government maximizes the same utility function as the
consumer subject to (3)-(6) and (10)-(13). Furthermore, we assume that the
government's budget is balanced. It should be noted, that outstanding
government's debt can easily be introduced into the model. As noted by for
example Barro (197j), under assuming Ricardo debt neutrality, meaning that
the interest rate on the government's bond is also r, this will not lead
to other results.




f u(c,g)e dt (16)
0
s.t. 9 - (rtb)9 - fk(1-TZ)(1-2y).





b- rb t n t w,~(1-iR) - c(1fTC), (20)
uc- x~(1tTC), (21)
c-{(1-2z)(1-Ty)f(k.R) - i- pÍi) f w~(TZ-Y~)}~(ltTC), (22)8




where equation (24) can be obtained from (5) and h(Ty) denotes the capital
to labor ratio. It should be noted that we can eliminate b and x.
Substituting (22) into (21) gives us a value for x. As already stated the
distribution of investment and consumption will not be influenced by
financial streams.
Furthermore, we assume that the tax rates have exogenously given
upperbounds:
0 ( TR ( TR ~ 1,
0 ~ Tc ~ 2c ~ 1,
0~ Ty l Ty C 1,





There could be several reasons for imposing upperbounds. If the tax rates
are high there is a great resistance of the tax payer to pay, high costs
of administration and complaince (cf. Alt ( 1983)). We try to formalize
these ideas by assuming upperbound on the tax rates. So, profits, sales,
consumption and labor are never taxed away completely. Furthermore, we as-
sume for reasons of analytical tractability Cobb-Douglas preferences
u(c.B) - alnc t(1-a)1nB. 0 C a~ 1,
and quadratic adjustment costs
(29)
P(i) - bi2, b ) 0. (30)
The maximisation of (16) with respect to (1~) through (30) yields the fol-
lowing necessary conditions:9
v - gy - ~H - (g-r-b)v - a - a9( 1 ) } ( 1-a)9(
TC ). v(~)-0. (31) ~9 2b 2bc 1tT 2bg ltT
c c
~ - ~~ - ~k - (p;b)a - lga(1-(1-Ty)(1-TZ)~(1}Te))ahl-~-v(1-Ty)
(1-~Z)ahl-a-C{(1-Ty)(1-zZ)~(1'TC))ahl-atwh(TZ-T1)},




(1-Ty)f(k,hk)-i-p(i)twhk(TZ-T~)}~(lt~c)2~ ~ ~ H Te- TeEL~.Ta~. (33)
0
TR
-~whk~(ltTC) t lgawhk~(ltTO) ~ 0 H T~- T~EC~,TR~.
0
(34)
-~[{(1-Ty)f(k,hk)twhk}~(1tTC)] t lga[{(1-2y)f(k,hk)twhk}~(ltt~)] t
T
1-a ~ Z -













~ 0 H Zy-~iyECO,Ty~.
Co
where the Hamiltonian is defined by
H - aln[{(1-TZ)(1-Ty)f(k,h(TY)k)-i-p(i) } wh(Ty)k(TZ-T~)}I(ltTe)] t
(1-a)1nLf(k,h(2y)k)-i-p(i)-{(1-TZ)(1-Ty)f(k,h(Ty)k)-i-p(i) .10
whk(TZ-TR)}~(ltTC)J } yl(rtb)q-~h(Ty)1-a(1-TZ)(1-Ty)) t
~(~(q)-bk). (37)
The costate variabele ~ which can be interpreted as the government's
shadow price of capital, will have a positive value. The costate variabele
y, which is the marginal value to the government of the firm's investment
rate, is typically negative, because the government and the firm have con-
flicting objectives. In other words the government can influence the
firm's investment decisions q by announcing a certain tax policy. The
value by which the government's objective is affected is given by y.
Define the switching functions for the different tax rates as
follows:
B~ (t) - -~whk~(1tTC) t lgawhk~(1t2c),
R




B~ (t) - -~[{(1-Ty)f(k,hk)twhk}~(ltic)] t
z
lga[{(1-Ty)f(k,hk)twhk}~(ltTC)] t y(1-Ty)~hl-6, (40)
hT w
B2y(t) --~[(1-2z){f(k.hk)t1GGhTYk}~(1tTC)t~ ly~y k] t lga[(1-TZ)
hT w
{f(k,hk).1~ohTYk}~(1}TC)t lyT k] t y(1-TZ)hl-6. (41)
Y
From (38) we obtain
if B (t) ) 0
TR
~~ - T~E [O,T~] if B~ (t) - 0.
~
0 if B (t) ( 0
TR
(42)11
Consider the case that a is relatively high (cf. (30)), then the weight
of government's consumption in total utility is relatively small and we
can derive the following result
BT (t) - BT (t) - 0 ~ BT (t) ? BT (t).
.~ c z y
(43)
which can be interpreted as follows: the government will impose wage and
consumption tax, such that the values of the switching functions B and
T~
B are equal to zero. This is the case for a whole class of linear com-
~C
binations between T~ and Tc. Because in that case the values of the
switching functions B and B are less than zero, these taxes will be on
Ty TZ
their lowerbounds, i.e. zero. If a is relatively small, government's con-
sumption is high, so it must collect a lot of money to keep the budget
balanced. Therefore the government sets T~ and ~c on their upperbounds and
it will also raise the profit tax to finance its expenditures. The last
tax rate which can be raised is the sales tax rate. It should be noted
that the government can raise this tax rate before the upperbound on the
sales tax rate has been reached.
So if the government raises taxes there is a classification of tax
rates, which it wants to raise first





Fig. 1 Classification of the tax rates
The reason for this is that profit and sales taxation are more distortion-
ary than the other tax rates, because of their influence on the capital
accumulation.12
The nature of the solution examined may be further clarified by a
numerical example, which is based on the following parameter values:
p-o.o3, b-o.o5. ~-0.5, T~-o.2, 2Z-o.3, RS-o.o44, b-io. (44)
In this example we assume that there are only two taxes, a sales and a
profit tax, which have the following upperbounds T~-0.2 and iz-o.3. In
table 1 the steady-state solutions for different values of ~ are given.
[insert table 1]
For a large value of a, i.e. 0.9, private consumption is preferred more
than public consumption and the government asks a relatively low amount of
wage tax and no profit tax. If a decreases, the amount of wage tax in-
creases until the moment that the upperbound on wage tax has been reached.
After this point that the upperbound is reached, the government will not
immediately increase its spendings by increasing the profit tax rate, be-
cause of its negative effect on the capital accumulation. Only at the
moment that a is small, i.e. 0.25, the government uses profit taxation to
finance its expenditures (see table 1).
4. About the time-inconsistency of optimal plans
In section 3 we have described aii optimal taxation plan for the
government. However, this optimal plan can be time-inconsistent. Once the
capital stock is installed, there is an incentive for the government to
renege on its announcement and ask a higher sales or profit tax rate. The
problem of a time-inconsistent optimizi~ig government in a dynamic economic
environment was first stated by Kydland and Prescott (197~). Obviously, a
time-inconsistent plan requires binding commitments to force the govern-
ment to stick to its announced tax strategy. However, it should be noted
that when reputational forces are important, binding contracts may not be
necessary to prevent the government from cheating (e.g. Kreps and Wilson
(1982)). So, if there are no binding contracts or no reputational forces
the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is no longer a rational expectations13
equilibrium and is no longer a useful concept. In that case the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium can be used in which case y(t)-0, yt ~ 0 and the
government ignores (31). Substituting y(t)-0 into (38)-(41) gives that the
switching functions of consumption, wage and profit tax become equall):
B (t) - B (t) - B (t) - 1-a - a - 0 ~ B (t). (45) z~ i~ 2Z g c Ty
This means that unless the upperbounds on these taxes are not reached the
government finances Lheir expenditures by wage, consumption and sales
taxes, where it is indifferent about which tax rates should be chosen.
Although it takes into account the effect of íts taxation on capital ac-
cumulation, it cannot deal with it, because every announced policy of low
capital taxation becomes suboptimal once the capital is installed and is
therefore incredible. So in general in the consistent case the capital ac-
cumulation will be lower and because of that the consumer's life-time
utility will be lower.
Let us now clearify the difference between the consistent and incon-
sistent case with a numerical example, where we assume the same
parametervalues as in table 1. Furthermore, assume in the consistent case
that the upperbound on wage tax is first reached2). In table 2 the steady-
state solution is given for the case that a-0.~5.
[insert table 2]
The consistent solution yields a higher value of steady-state profit tax
rate and because of that a lower level of capital stock than in the con-
sistent solution (see table 2). This lower level of capital stock in the
consistent case yields a lower level level of steady-sate utility. In the
inconsistent case the share of public consumption goods in the total out-
put is lower, but private consumption and total utility will be higher,
because there is more capital in this econoroy.
So the outcome in the consistent case is bad for society. Therefore,
as pointed out by, e.g. Kydland (1989, p. 268), there would be attempts,14
like institutional arrangements, laws or reputational forces to prevent
the government from cheating. In practice, the firm makes its investment
decision based on its expectations of current and future profit and sales
tax rates. In general there are reasons to believe that the expected
profit tax rate is higher than what follows from optimal but time-
inconsistent behavior, but lower than one should expect from purely time-
consistent behavior. A more detailed description of these expectations
based on modelling of threats and incentives could be an interesting area
of future research (cf. Pohjola (1984)).
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a macro-economic dynamic model with
value-maximizing firms, infinitely long-lived utility-optimizing consumers
~and a government, which tries to choose its tax instruments in such a way
that the utility of the consumer is maximized. The formal structure of the
interaction between government and firms or consumers corresponds to an
open-loop Stackelberg game with the government as leader. Moreover, there
was market clearing on the labor and output market.
Recently, there was a discussion in the United States about which
tax rate should be raised confronted with a too large deficit. From the
framework we have presented we can derive that there is a strong incentive
to raise consumption or wage tax. The reason for this is quite clear, be-
cause both taxes cannot be a source for time-inconsistency and they have
no influence on the capital accumulation. The answer to the question
whether the consumption or wage tax rate should be chosen is not given by
our model. Moreover, in the literature (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980),
Laffer (1981)) there has been given some arguments why consumption tax
should be preferred. Incorporating such effects into our model should be
an interesting field of future research.
As already noted before, the introduction of optimizing government
behavior in dynamic economic models may lead to the problem of time-
inconsistency. However, this problem of time-ínconsistency only occurs, if
the government chooses profit or sales taxation to finance its
expenditures. So by choosing the right instruments the government can deal
with the problem of time-inconsistency. Also reputational forces could belj
important to prevent the government from cheating (cf. Kreps and Wilson
(1982)).
Of course, the model presented here is simple. Nevertheless, it
points out some important issues oF normative tax behavior of the
government. In future work, there are many avenues to explore. Firstly, we
can bring money into our model. Especially the question how the optimal
monetary policies will influence capital accumulation is of interest.
Secondly, a more general utility framework with leisure and money can be
analysed. Thirdly, a more game-theoretic framework with threats, incen-
tives and feedback and closed-loop information could be an interesting
feature of future research. Finall,y, the introduction of distributive
goals can be of interest.
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Notes
1) Unless the wage, the consumption and the profit tax rates are not on
their upperbound, this equality between the switching functions hold.
2) This not necessarely follows from (45). In fact all kind of linear com-
binations between T~ and TZ are possible. However, the combinations
with low TZ yields more capital accumulation. So, from this point of
view there is a reason, even for the consistent case, for first raising
the wage tax before the profit tax is raised. However, it should be
noted that directly after the upperbound on wage tax have been reached
the government increases the profit tax, so that g~c-(1-a)~a. This is
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